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NOTES
NONACQUIESCENCE: HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES' REFUSAL TO FOLLOW FEDERAL
COURT PRECEDENT
Nonacquiescence is an administrative agency's refusal to follow federal
court decisions in subsequent cases.' For several years, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services2 (the "Secretary") followed a policy of non-
acquiescence similar to the nonacquiescence practices of a number of
other federal agencies.' In 1980, however, Congress passed the Social
Security Act of 1980, which required review of all current disability ben-
efit recipients.4 The resulting burden on the judiciary contributed largely
to the federal courts' rejection of the practice of nonacquiescence.5 This
Note examines the legitimacy of the federal courts' response to
nonacquiescence.
Part I of this Note reviews agency rationales for nonacquiescence.
Part II examines the constitutional underpinnings of nonacquiescence
and the impact of United States v. Mendoza on the related issue of the use
of collateral estoppel against the government. Part III of this Note ex-
amines the Supreme Court's consideration of nonacquiescence in cases
involving the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") and the National La-
bor Relations Board (the "NLRB"). Part IV examines the Secretary's
use of nonacquiescence and the resulting reaction of the federal courts.
Part V of this Note analyzes the propriety of the federal courts' response
1. A memorandum to all administrative law judges ("ALJs") in the Department of Health
and Human Services provides in pertinent part: "AIJs are responsible for applying the Secretary's
policies and guidelines regardless of court decisions below the level of the Supreme Court." Memo-
randum from Louis B. Hays, Associate Commissioner of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, to all
ALJs (Jan. 7, 1981), reprinted in Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative
Law Judge, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs; 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 216-17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Social
Security Disability Reviews].
2. The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary to set forth regulations for the determina-
tion of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1982). The Social Security Administration is a branch of the
Department of Health and Human Services. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 6 (8th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK].
3. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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to the Secretary's use of nonacquieseence. In Part VI, this Note reviews
possible limitations on nonacquiescence. This Note concludes that the
courts' cursory treatment of nonacquiescence is unwarranted.
I. THE RATIONALE BEHIND NONACQUIESCENCE
Administrative agencies rationalize the policy6 of nonacquiescence in a
number of ways. First, agencies insist that nonacquiescence provides
uniform application of nationwide programs.7 Second, agencies claim
that nonacquiescence is necessary to fulfill their responsibility to manage
federal programs.8 Third, agencies assert that nonacquiescence promotes
equal treatment of litigants throughout the country.9 Fourth, agencies
allege that nonacquiescence and relitigation create intercircuit conflict,
prompting Supreme Court review.10 Finally, as a tactical matter, agen-
cies argue that nonacquiescence and relitigation are necessary when the
case at bar presents a factual or procedural posture unfavorable for
Supreme Court review."
6. Nonacquiescence is a governmental policy. U.S. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FED-
ERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR CHANGE 139-40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION ON REVISION]. President
Lincoln, in one of the earliest examples of nonacquiescence, refused to adhere to the Dred Scott
decision beyond the case. Commenting on nonacquiescence, he noted:
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole of the people is
to be irrevocably fixed by the Supreme Court, the instant they are made.., the people will
have ceased to be their own rulers, having to the extent practically resigned their Govern-
ment into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
7 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3206, 3210 (1897).
7. Disability Amendments of 1982, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the
Comm. of Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982) (testimony of
Louis B. Hays, Associate Commissioner) [hereinafter cited as Disability Amendments of 1982].
8. See Disability Amendments of 1982, supra note 7, at 15.
9. Id.
10. COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 143.
11. See, eg., Memorandum from Sandy Crane, Associate Commissioner for Operational Policy
and Procedure, Department of Health and Human Services, to Donald A. Conya, Assistant General
Counsel, reprinted in Disability Amendments of 1982, supra note 7, at 228-29. The memorandum
cites a number of legitimate reasons for the Secretary's nonacquiescence in Finnegan v. Mathews,
641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). Finnegan required medical improvement prior to disability benefit
termination. The memorandum notes that the "SSA would face problems in complying with the
court's order because in many ... cases the evidence with which [disability was] allowed is either
incomplete, unavailable, or no longer in existence." Disability Amendments of 1982, supra note 7, at
229. The memorandum also argues that the Department should not seek Supreme Court review
because the claimant met current disability requirements even under the Secretary's regulations.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF NONACQUIESCENCE
The concept of judicial review, stare decisis, and nomnutual offensive
collateral estoppel comprise the constitutional underpinnings of
nonacquiescence.
A. Judicial Review and Stare Decisis
The true scope of judicial review is unclear. In Marbury v. Madison,12
Chief Justice Marshall established the principle of judicial review,13 hold-
ing that the Court has power to declare an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional.1 4 Marbury implicitly suggested that the power of judicial review
affects only the judiciary and the parties to a case. 5 In United States v.
Nixon, 6 however, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of judicial re-
view, holding that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution prevails
over a contrary reading by the executive branch. 7 Nixon suggested that
the power to interpret the Constitution rests exclusively with the
Supreme Court. 8
Although Marbury and Nixon explored the power of judicial review,
Cooper v. Aaron 9 addressed the effect of the Court's power to interpret
the Constitution. In Cooper, the Governor and the Legislature of Arkan-
12. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
13. Marshall asserted that -lilt is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is." Id. at 177. This statement, however, does not speak to the effect of
adjudication beyond the case. For a general discussion of the scope of judicial review, see G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25-35 (10th ed. 1980).
14. Marshall interpreted § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as impermissibly enlarging the scope
of the Court's original jurisdiction. 5 U.S. at 137.
15. "Under Marbury, the Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience
by all within the purview of the rule that is declared." Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965) (emphasis added). Accord Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial
Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1457 (1954); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 n.33 (1983).
16. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
17. President Nixon argued that the executive privilege protected certain tapes and documents
from disclosure. Id. at 686.
18. In Nixon, the Court relied on Marbury for the proposition that the Court determines the
scope of the executive privilege. Id. at 705. Professor Gunther argues that this reliance conveys "a
misleading broad view of judicial competence, exclusivity and supremacy." Gunther, Judicial He-
gemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 30, 33 (1974). Gunther objects to the notion that Marbury "precludes a constitutional inter-
pretation that grants final authority to another branch." Id. at 34.
19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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sas argued that the Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education20 did
not bind nonparties.2 1 In a unanimous decision, the Court stated that its
interpretation of the Constitution binds the states and their subdivisions,
even though they may not be parties to the action.22
Similarly, under the doctrine of stare decisis, a court that establishes a
rule of law in a particular decision must adhere to that rule in subsequent
cases.23 In addition, the rule binds lower courts of that jurisdiction.24
Stare decisis is a rule of the courts rather than a rule of litigants.2"
Although a court's decision binds the parties to the case, nonparties often
adhere to the decision as a matter of prudence and respect rather than
command.26 One commentator argues that congressional and executive
adherence to an earlier opinion of the judicial branch is discretionary,
subject only to electoral review and reconsideration by the Court.27
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine for public school
education.
21. The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas opposed desegregation of the City of Little
Rock's schools. 358 U.S. at 1. Petitioners' amicus curiae asserted that Brown did not displace an act
of Congress that supported the "separate but equal" doctrine. Amicus Curiae for Petitioners at 16-
19, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
22. The Court interpreted Marbury to state:
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Coun-
try as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that
the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown
case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding
effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly com-
mitted by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support his Constitution."
358 U.S. at 18.
23. Ellenbogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should be Applied, 20
TEMP. L.Q. 503, 503-04 (1947).
24. Pound, hat of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 6 (1941).
25. Defendant's Brief, Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), reprinted in Social
Security Disability Reviews, supra note 1, at 407.
26. Hart, supra note 15, at 1456, 1457-59; Wechsler, supra note 15, at 1008. Justice Jackson
stated that "[t]he judicial decree, however broadly worded, actually binds, in most instances, only
the parties to the case. As to others, it is merely a weather vane showing which way the judicial
wind is blowing." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 13 (1955).
27. Hart, supra note 15, at 1458.
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B. The Doctrine of Nonmutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel. United
States v. Mendoza
Collateral estoppel limits relitigation of settled issues.28 Nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel enables a plaintiff to preclude relitigation of
an issue decided against the defendant in a prior action with the same or
a different party.29
In United States v. Mendoza,30 the Supreme Court held that non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply against the United
States Government.31 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument
that the Government must adhere to or appeal decisions that it considers
erroneous. 32 The Court noted that a governmental decision not to appeal
contemplates policy choices to which a court should defer.33 In addition,
the Court noted that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel's concern
with limiting wasteful use of judicial resources would be ill-served if ap-
plied to the Government. 34 The Court reasoned that applying the doc-
trine to the Government would force the Solicitor General to appeal
every adverse decision, regardless of court and governmental cost.35 The
Mendoza Court did not address the effect of stare decisis on administra-
tive agencies in subsequent litigation. The Court's emphasis on deferring
28. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of 111. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
29. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
30. 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
31. Id. at 574. The Court stated "that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply
against the government... to preclude relitigation of issues such as those in this case." Id (emphasis
added). See generally Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 70
IOWA L. REv. 113, 121 (1984).
The Court noted that the Government's unique position in litigation outweighs traditional collat-
eral estoppel concerns. 104 S. Ct. at 574. Most courts interpret Mendoza to bar absolutely applica-
tion of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the Government. See Sun Towers v. Heckler,
725 F.2d 315, 323 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting potential ambiguity in Mendoza, but applying it to
prohibit issue preclusion against the Secretary when certain policy concerns exist). See also United
States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1984) (mechanical application ofMendoza); Sohio
Transp. Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 620, 637 (1984) (same).
32. 104 S. Ct. at 573.
33. In Mendoza, the government's decision not to appeal an earlier federal district court deci-
sion related to the Carter administration's "amnesty" policy. Id.
34, Id. at 573-74.
35. Id. at 573. The Court also noted that precluding the use of nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel against the Government would permit circuit courts to "explore" an issue and develop
various interpretations prior to Supreme Court review. Id. at 572. See Levin & Leeson, supra note
31, at 119 (asserting that Mendoza increases the burden on trial courts and conserves appellate court
resources).
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to governmental policy choices in litigation suggests, however, that
courts should apply a degree of restraint prior to extending the doctrine
of stare decisis to include administrative agencies within its purview.
III. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF NONACQUIESCENCE
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitu-
tionality of nonacquiescence, it has recognized some of the positive fea-
tures of the policy in a series of cases involving the IRS and the NLRB.
In United States v. Estate of Donnelly,36 the Supreme Court noted the
IRS's policy of nonacquiescing in the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of an
Internal Revenue Code provision.37 In upholding the IRS's position,
Justice Marshall noted that governmental adherence to its belief of
proper statutory construction is not only legitimate but also necessary for
the uniform application of acts of Congress. 38
In Helvering v. Hallock,39 the IRS included the value of a decedent's
remainder interest in a trust for estate tax purposes, despite contrary
Supreme Court authority.' The Sixth Circuit, bound by precedent, dis-
allowed the inclusion.4 The Supreme Court reversed, overruling its
prior decision.42
36. 397 U.S. 286 (1970).
37. In Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944), the Sixth Circuit held that
§ 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code, which determines the validity of a government tax lien against
a subsequent purchase of land, invalidates a government tax lien not filed with the county register of
deeds. The government refused to follow Youngblood. The Supreme Court upheld the Govern-
ment's position in United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961). In Estate of
Donnelly, the Court retroactively applied its Union Central decision. 397 U.S. 286.
The IRS frequently nonacquiesces in federal court decisions. See Vestal, Relitigation by Federal
Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123, 124 (1977).
Although the IRS frequently nonacquiesces, the tax court considers itself bound by circuit court
decisions. Golson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). For an overview of the IRS's litigation and
nonacquiescence policies, see Rogovin, The Four R's. Regulation, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactiv-
ity. A View from Within, 43 TAxEs 756 (1965). See also Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1966) (issue relitigated in the Fifth Circuit in Home Constr. Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d
1165 (5th Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
38. 397 U.S. at 294. Justice Douglas, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart,
dissented from the retroactive application of Union Central. Id. at 297-300.
39. 309 U.S. 106 (1939).
40. See Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935).
41. Commissioner v. Hallock, 102 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 309 U.S. 106 (1939).
42. 309 U.S. at 122. Hallock supports the argument that even Supreme Court review binds
only the courts and the parties, and not an executive agency. Chief Justice Stone concurred without
overruling St Louis Trust Co. Justice Roberts, dissenting, objected to the overruling of St. Louis
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In Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB,43 the Sixth Circuit held that a union
representative may waive the rights of union members to distribute union
literature. The NLRB relitigated the issue eight years later in the Sixth
Circuit.' Following Armco Steel Corp., the court rejected the NLRB's
claim.45 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a bargain-
ing representative may not waive the rights of union members to dis-
tribute union literature.4 6
In Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB,47 Judge Wright of the
District of Columbia Circuit in his concurring opinion relied on the
Supreme Court's implicit recognition of nonacquiescence. Judge Wright
rejected the argument that a court decision binds an agency beyond a
particular case.48  Noting a history of intracircuit relitigation by the
NLRB, Judge Wright found it "unwise" to suggest that the NLRB must
adhere to a court of appeals decision.49 He noted that Supreme Court
vindication of the NLRB's position after intracircuit relitigation pro-
vided legitimate authority for nonacquiescence.50
Estate of Donnelly and Judge Wright's opinion in Yellow Taxi ex-
pressly approved of administrative agency nonacquiescence. Hallock
and Armco Steel implicitly suggested Supreme Court approval of nonac-
quiescence, recognizing that strict agency acquiescence within a circuit
Trust Co. He stressed that the Court must adhere to precedent. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting,
objected to the NLRB's failure to explain its present position.
43. 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
44. See Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
45. 474 F.2d at 1270.
46. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974). Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, concurred in part and dissented in part. Stewart opined that a union
representative may not waive the rights of union members who seek to displace the existing union.
A union, however, may waive the rights of union members who seek to distribute "self-serving"
union literature. Id. at 327-32.
47. 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (NLRB relitigated issue whether taxicab lessees are employ-
ees within the context of the National Labor Relations Act).
48. Id. at 384-85. Judge MacKinnon, in a separate opinion, argued that the NLRB must defer
to a prior decision of the circuit. Id. at 383.
49. "[Aln agency charged with formulating uniform and orderly national policy in adjudica-
tions is not bound to acquiesce in the views of the U.S. courts of appeals." Id. at 384 (quoting S&H
Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1273, 1278-79
(5th Cir. 1981)).
50. Judge Wright noted two decisions, Charles D. Bonnano Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454
U.S. 404 (1982), and NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977), in which
the Supreme Court upheld NLRB positions that a number of circuit courts had previously rejected.
721 F.2d at 385.
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would prevent relitigation and correction by the Supreme Court.5"
IV. NONACQUIESCENCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
The Secretary, like the IRS and the NLRB, nonacquiesces in federal
court decisions. The Secretary engages in formal nonacquiescence 52 by
issuing a written statement evidencing the agency's refusal to follow the
court's opinion. The Secretary distributes this statement to the Social
Security Administration for its use in the benefit review process.53 The
Secretary also engages in informal nonacquiescence by failing to disclose
recent federal court interpretations of the law to the individuals who ad-
minister the benefit review process.54
In 1980, Congress passed a Social Security Act of 1980"5 requiring
review of all current disability benefit recipients. This Act resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of appeals brought in the federal
courts.56 Recognizing that nonacquiescence and intracircuit relitigation
burden the court system, the federal courts began to question the Secre-
tary's use of these policies.57
51. For examples of additional cases in which the Supreme Court adopted an agency's nonac-
quiescence position, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981) (IRS
relitigated the proper depletion deduction for an integrated miner manufacturer in the cement busi-
ness); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (NLRB relitigated the issue whether the
National Labor Relations Act mandates union representation at an employee investigative inter-
view); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) (IRS relitigated the proper tax treatment of income
received from oil and gas leases).
52. The Associate Commissioner of the Office of Hearings and Appeals noted the agency's
longstanding policy of "formal nonacquiescence" to court decisions. See Disability Amendments of
1982, supra note 7, at 15. See, ag., 1982 Soc. SEc. R. 82-94(c) (nonacquiescing in Patti v.
Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982)); 1982 Soc. SEC. R. 82-10(c) (nonacquiescing in Finnegan v.
Mathews, 641 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1981)).
53. For a discussion of the disability claim review process, see Note, Disability Claims and the
Social Security Adminstration: Application of the New Vocational Regulations, 18 NEw ENG. 919
(1983); Note, Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Decisions: A Proposal for Change, 11 TEx.
TECH. L. REv. 215 (1980).
54. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1011 n.5 (D. Minn. 1984) (noting and rejecting
Secretary's policy of informal nonacquiescence in Eighth Circuit's disability standard for pain).
55. Social Security Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 460 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (Supp. V 1981)).
56. The New York Times reported that the Social Security Administration's confidential study
located 48,000 Social Security cases pending review in federal courts. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at
1, col. 3. In February of 1983, approximately 27,000 Social Security cases were pending in federal
courts. See Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal:. An 4nswer to a Critique, 10 J. LEoIs. 324,
325 (1983).
57. See, eg., Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Secretary's nonac-
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In Lopez v. Heckler,5" the plaintiffs brought a class action suit to com-
pel the Secretary to follow the Ninth Circuit's medical improvement
standard in disability cases.59 The United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted the plaintiffs' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction.6' The court stated that the Secretary's nonacquiescence
resulted in unequal treatment of claimants under the disability benefit
system.61 The court also concluded that nonacquiescence violates the
due process clause62 and the doctrine of separation of powers. 63  The
court reasoned that Marbury v. Madison limits governmental relitigation
of issues previously decided by the circuit. 64
quiescence in Ninth Circuit decisions requiring medical improvement prior to disability benefit ter-
mination); Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Secretary's
nonacquiescence in Eighth Circuit decisions requiring consideration of subjective complaints of pain
in disability determination); Nelson v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Secre-
tary's nonacquiescence in Eighth Circuit decisions concerning subjective pain standard); Polaski v.
Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997 (D. Minn. 1984) (rejecting the Secretary's nonacquiescence in Eighth
Circuit decisions concerning standards for evaluation of pain and medical improvement); Holden v.
Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (rejecting the Secretary's nonacquiescence in Sixth
Circuit decisions concerning disability improvement standard); Buckner v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp.
1536 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (rejecting the Secretary's nonacquiescence in Eighth Circuit decisions con-
cerning standard for evaluation of pain); Rivera v. Heckler, 568 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1983) (re-
jecting the Secretary's nonacquiescence in Third Circuit decisions requiring the agency to give
substantial weight to the uncontradicted testimony of claimant's treating physician). See also
Steiberger v. Heckler, No. 84 CIV 1302 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1985) (enjoining the Secretary's nonac-
quiescence policy).
58. 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 104 S.
Ct. 10 (1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ninth Circuit affirms preliminary injunction).
59. Id. at 27. The Ninth Circuit established this standard in Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582
(9th Cir. 1982), and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
60. 572 F. Supp. at 29-30.
61 Id. at 30. The court stated that nonacquiescence creates a "dual system of law" in cases
involving the termination of disability benefits. The court explained that:
[i]f... a claimant has the determination and the financial and physical strength and lives
long enough to make it through the administrative process, he can turn to the courts and
ultimately expect them to apply the law [announced by the Ninth Circuit). If exhaustion
overtakes him and he falls somewhere along the road leading to such ultimate relief, the
nonacquiescence and the resulting termination stand.
Id.
62. The court stated that claimant's procedural due process argument raised sufficiently "seri-
ous legal questions" for preliminary injunction. Id at 30. But cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (holding that procedural due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to termi-
nation of disability benefits).
63. The court asserted that the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence "operate[s] outside the
law." 572 F. Supp. at 30.
64. The court cited Marbury for the proposition that "governmental agencies, like all individu-
als and other entities, are obliged to follow and apply the law as it is interpreted by the courts." Id
at 29. Accord Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1983) (NLRB must follow Sixth
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Secretary's claim
that the preliminary injunction was improper.65 The court noted that the
Secretary's use of nonacquiescence undermines the doctrine of separation
of powers.66 The court also noted that Mendoza did not control the re-
sult because the plaintiffs sought to bind the Secretary by stare decisis
rather than by nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. 67
The Eighth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the Secretary's
nonacquiescence policy in Hillhouse v. Harris.61 Prior to Hillhouse, the
Eighth Circuit required the Secretary to consider subjective complaints
of pain in making disability benefit determinations.69 Commenting on
the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence, the court stressed that an
Eighth Circuit decision binds litigants and administrative agencies, as
well as lower courts within the circuit.70 In a concurring opinion, Judge
McMillian added that failure to follow the court's decisions in future
cases would lead to contempt proceedings against the Secretary.71
In Holden v. Heckler,72 plaintiffs brought a class action suit challeng-
Circuit rule requiring consideration of entire administrative record); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623
F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the NLRB's nonacquiescence in Second Circuit opinion that was
affirmed by the Supreme Court); Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980)
(NLRB obligated under principles of stare decisis to follow Seventh Circuit decision requiring
NLRB to consider proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry before ordering labor
bargaining); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting the NLRB's
nonacquiescence in Third Circuit decisions that establish bargaining standards).
65. 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984). The court, however, reversed the trial court's injunction to
the extent it reached claimants who were terminated prior to the Ninth Circuit's decisions requiring
medical improvement before disability benefit termination. Id. at 1510.
The Secretary sought a stay of the district court's preliminary injunction in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit denied
the motion. Judge Pregerson, commenting on the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence, added that
"Ithe Secretary's ill-advised policy of refusing to obey the decisional law of the circuit is akin to the
repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification." Id. at 1441.
66. Id. at 1497. The court stated that "this case presents.., the executive branch defying the
courts and undermining what are perhaps the fundamental precepts of our constitutional system-
the separation of powers and respect for the law." Id.
67. Id. at 1497 n.5. For a discussion of United States v. Mendoza, see infra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text.
68. 715 F.2d 428 (1983).
69. See, eg., Brand v. Secretary of Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 526 (8th
Cir. 1980); Northcutt v. Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1978).
70. 715 F.2d at 430. The court cited Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 1965, 1970 (3d
Cir. 1979), for its proposition.
71. 715 F.2d at 430.
72. 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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ing the Secretary's use of nonacquiescence. 73 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the Secretary from implementing a disability standard that the Sixth Cir-
cuit had previously rejected.74 In granting the claimants' motion for a
preliminary injunction, the Holden court asserted that Marbury v.
Madison and the principle of stare decisis compelled the Secretary to ap-
ply the decisions of the Sixth Circuit in all subsequent cases. 75 The court
rejected the Secretary's argument that Mendoza sanctioned an agency's
use of nonacquiescence.76
Although Congress subsequently resolved many of the substantive ar-
eas of dispute between the litigants and the Secretary,77 the unresolved
issue remains regarding the extent to which a federal court decision binds
the Department of Health and Human Services in subsequent cases.78
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS' REJECTION OF THE
SECRETARY'S POLICY OF NONACQUIESCENCE
The federal courts rejected the Secretary's use of nonacquiescence, rea-
soning that the power of judicial review and stare decisis mandated
agency adherence to judicial precedent.79 This response to nonacquies-
73. Id. at 466. Claimants brought a class action suit challenging the Secretary's nonacquies-
cence in Sixth Circuit decisions requiring medical improvement prior to disability benefit termina-
tion. Id.
74. See Hayes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 656 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1981) (placing burden of proof on
Secretary to introduce evidence that claimant's condition has not improved). In Holden, the Secre-
tary placed the burden of proof on the disability benefit recipient. 584 F. Supp. at 470-71.
75. 584 F. Supp. at 490-91. The court cited Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351 (6th
Cir. 1983), for the proposition that Marbury binds nonparties. Id.
76. Id. at 491. For other examples of the federal courts' rejection of the Secretary's nonacquies-
cence policy, see supra note 57.
77. By enacting the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460,
98 Stat. 1794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), Congress resolved many of the
substantive areas of dispute between the litigants and the Secretary. The Act adopts the circuit
courts' view requiring medical improvement prior to disability benefit termination. Id. § 1. The Act
also adopts the Hillhouse approach requiring the Secretary to consider subjective complaints of pain
in determining disability benefits. Id. § 3(a).
78. In response to criticism, the Secretary recently promulgated a modified nonacquiescence
policy. See DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES INTERIM CIRCULAR No. 185 (1985). Under
the modified policy, administrative law judges may recommend a decision that favors a claimant in
accordance with applicable circuit court precedent, despite contrary Social Security Administration
policy. The Appeals Council automatically reviews such decisions. The Council may accept an
administrative law judge's recommendation or it may deny the recommendation if it believes that the
issue merits relitigation in the circuit.
Although this policy represents a significant retreat from the Secretary's prior position on nonac-
quiescence, the policy still enables the agency to nonacquiesce in certain circumstances.
79. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
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cence, however, represents a significant expansion of the scope of judicial
review, meriting more than the courts' cursory explanations.
First, the power of judicial review should not preclude nonacquies-
cence. Marbury implicitly suggested that the power of judicial review
affects only the judiciary and the parties to a case.80 Therefore, judicial
power should not extend to or bind a governmental agency. Although
Cooper v. Aaron provides support for the federal courts' position, Cooper
is distinguishable. Cooper held that a Supreme Court interpretation of
the Constitution binds nonparty states and municipalities."' Unlike
Cooper, however, the federal courts purport to bind a coequal branch of
the federal government with lower court precedent.8 2 Moreover, stare
decisis should not preclude nonacquiescence. Stare decisis affects only
the judiciary and the parties to a case. 3 If stare decisis and notions of
judicial review bound all agencies and litigants to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the law, the Court might never overrule itself.84
Second, Mendoza suggests that the tenets that preclude the use of non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel against the Government are equally
applicable to preclude an expansion of judicial review and stare decisis.
Mendoza recognized that a Government's decision to appeal or relitigate
involves a variety of practical and policy considerations to which a court
should defer.8" Similarly, the Secretary's decision whether to appeal or
relitigate contemplates an assessment of numerous practical and policy
choices. Therefore, Mendoza supports the conclusion that judicial re-
view and stare decisis should not preclude the Secretary's policy of non-
acquiescence and relitigation.
Finally, the Supreme Court's consideration of nonacquiescence indi-
cates that the federal courts incorrectly rejected the Secretary's policy of
nonacquiescence. The Supreme Court has expressly and impliedly ap-
80. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
82. The House Report to the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 notes:
[t]he application of Supreme Court decisions to executive branch policies is virtually undis-
puted: if a particular policy is found unconstitutional, or contrary to the statute, that
decision is binding on the agency. The appropriate application of circuit and district court
decisions to agency policies is not... clear cut.
H.R. REP. No. 98-618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984).
83. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
84. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 14, Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp.
26 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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proved of administrative agency nonacquiescence.86 In short, because
traditional notions of the power of judicial review and stare decisis do not
preclude nonacquiescence, and because the tenets that underlie Mendoza
implicitly approved of the policy, the Secretary's use of nonacquiescence
appears constitutionally legitimate.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES' NONACQUIESCENCE POLICY
A. Efficiency and Fairness
Although nonacquiescence may be constitutionally justified, concerns
of efficiency and fairness support its limited use. 7 Once a circuit court
firmly establishes its policy, relitigation of that question within the circuit
wastes governmental resources. 8  Moreover, although nonacquiescence
promotes equal treatment of claimants throughout the entire Social Se-
curity system, it produces gross inequality among claimants within a cir-
cuit. 9 Claimants who appeal an administrative agency's adverse
decision to federal court receive the benefit of the federal court's rule.90
Claimants who lack the resources and perserverance to appeal, however,
are bound by the Secretary's interpretation.91 These considerations sug-
gest that the Secretary should exercise restraint in her use of
nonacquiescence.
B. Proposed Limitations
Professor Wechsler argues that the government should acquiesce only
after repeated litigation without court reversal.92 This approach would
recognize concerns of judicial efficiency and would permit a degree of
administrative agency relitigation. 93 In addition, Wechsler's framework
86. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
87. See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE, SOCIAL SECURITY HEAR-
INGS AND APPEALS, A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM 112
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CENTER STUDY]. See also Vestal, supra note 37, at 175.
88. Vestal, supra note 37, at 175.
89. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
90. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Mathews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ninth Circuit imposing
requirement for medical improvement prior to terminating disability benefits).
91. See supra note 1.
92. See Wechsler, supra note 15, at 1008-09.
93. A study conducted by the National Center for Administrative Justice criticizes the Secre-
tary's policy of nonacquiescence. The study, however, asserts that legitimate reasons to nonacquies-
cence exist. It recommends a flexible approach, stressing formal published nonacquescence. The
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would be compatible with Mendoza's concern for judicial deference to
governmental decisions to appeal.94 This approach would also be recon-
cilable with past Supreme Court approval of nonacquiescence. 5 Unlike
the lower federal courts' absolute bar, an adoption of Wechsler's formu-
lation would be consistent with traditional notions of the power of judi-
cial review and stare decisis.96 Although ad hoc, it would provide the
flexibility to curb abusive relitigation tactics.
The House of Representatives has also proposed a plan to limit the use
of nonacquiescence.97 The proposal would force agency adherence to
court of appeals decisions within a circuit. 98 Although Congress did not
adopt the proposal, it remains a possibility for future use. Under the
proposed plan, the Department of Health and Human Services would be
required to acquiesce or petition for Supreme Court review. 99 The pro-
posal would require adherence if the Supreme Court denied the agency's
petition. 100
The adherence requirement proposal, however, would invade the Ex-
ecutive's power to administer the Social Security Act. In addition, it
would prevent uniform application of the Social Security Act at the ad-
ministrative level.101 Moreover, the proposal would preclude nonacqui-
escence when the agency had legitimate reasons for not seeking Supreme
study argues that this procedure would inform those implementing the benefit review process how to
treat federal court opinions. By explaining the reason for nonacquiescence, the Secretary would
reassure the judiciary that judicial authority is not ignored arbitrarily. Also, formal nonacquieseence
compels the Secretary to confront and evaluate the courts' holdings. See NATIONAL CENTER
STUDY, supra note 87, at 114.
This flexible procedure would be consistent with the Wechsler framework. It would, however,
place an additional duty on the Secretary. This duty would not be unreasonably burdensome given
the Secretary's current formal nonacquiescence policy.
In Lopez, the Secretary formally nonacquiesced in Ninth Circuit decisions. Under the Wechsler
formula, relitigation by the Secretary would not be justified despite formal nonacquiescence if the
relitigated Ninth Circuit decisions were firmly established in the circuit. Both Patti v. Schweiker,
669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), and Finnegan v. Mathews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), however,
were relatively recent decisions at the time of Lopez. Absent continued reaffirmation of those deci-
sions within the Ninth Circuit, the Secretary's relitigation in Lopez would appear to satisfy the
Wechsler formulation, particularly in light of the number of other circuits that did not require a
showing of medical improvement prior to terminating disability benefits.
94. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
97. See H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 302 (1984).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Court review.' °2
Nevertheless, the proposal possesses several positive features.
Although the adherence requirement proposal would result in intercir-
cuit differentiation, the plan would further intracircuit equality among
claimants. 103 Moreover, the proposal would not preclude the Secretary
from obtaining congressional clarification of the statute in issue."°
Congress' proposal to create a federal Social Security Court would also
limit the Secretary's use of nonacquiescence.' °5 Under the proposal, all
appeals from the administrative agency would go directly to the Social
Security Court.'0 6 This court would be staffed by twenty presidentially-
appointed judges with ten-year judicial terms.'0° The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would have exclusive ju-
risdiction to review Social Security Court decisions.' 08
The single court system would create uniform nationwide precedent,
thereby allaying agency concern for uniform application of the Social
Security Act."° By eliminating a primary rationale for nonacquiescence,
the proposal would reduce intracircuit relitigation and its burden on fed-
eral district courts. 1° Finally, the Social Security Act would permit stat-
utory interpretation by judges possessing developed expertise in the
area. "
Opponents of the proposal dispute the need for a Social Security
Court. They claim that the burden on federal courts is decreasing." 2 In
addition, opponents argue that social security litigation is noncomplex
and well-suited to local solutions." 3 Opponents argue that creating a
new federal court would entail unwanted expense. 4 Moreover, oppo-
102. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
104. H.R. REP. No. 98-618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984).
105. H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2815 (1981). Other specialized federal
courts include the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982), and the United States Court of Military
Appeals, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982).
106. H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
107. H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., § 1130(c)(1) (1981).
108. H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., § 1130(g) (1981). The Supreme Court would have the
power to review constitutional and statutory issues.
109. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE
222-23 (1981).
110. See id. at 223.
111. Id.
112. See Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. LEGIs. 229, 237-39 (1982).
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id. at 240-41. Professor Ogilvy estimates that the proposed court would cost $10,000,000
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nents favor generalist federal district court judges over specialists, claim-
ing that the possibility of institutional bias by specialist judges would
necessitate substantial judicial independence.II 5
The proposal's creation of ten-year judicial terms, however, would en-
sure this independence. 1 6 Congress could provide even greater indepen-
dence by providing a fifteen-year term.1 17  In addition, recent data
indicate that social security litigation in federal courts is increasing and is
burdensome.11 Moreover, the Social Security Act does not suggest con-
gressional intent to provide local solutions to perceived problems.' 19 The
Social Security Court would provide a means to alleviate the serious bur-
dens placed on the federal court system.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts must reassess the constitutionality of the Health
and Human Services' use of nonacquiescence. The courts' assertion that
Marbury v. Madison and stare decisis control the constitutionality issue is
inconsistent with a traditional view of the power of judicial review, stare
decisis, Supreme Court approval of agency nonacquiescence, and Men-
doza. The Wechsler proposal would permit a degree of agency nonacqui-
escence and relitigation and would address judicial efficiency concerns.
The Social Security Court proposal would provide uniformity among the
circuits and would relieve the federal courts of the burden of social secur-
ity litigation. In addition, the Social Security Court proposal would cor-
rect the disparate treatment of disability claimants. Both proposals
would effectively limit the undesirable effects of nonacquiescence, while
retaining the benefits that underlie its use.
W Gordon Dobie
per year. Id. For an opposing perspective, see Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An An-
swer to a Critique, 10 J. LEGIS. 324 (1983).
115. The House Subcommittee on Social Security reports that this opposition arises from legal
aid attorneys. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
97th Cong., Ist Sess., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: PENDING PROBLEM AND PRO-
POSED SOLUTIONS 12, 14 (Comm. Print 1981).
116. H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1981).
117. See Amer, supra note 114, at 342.
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying tekt.
119. See Arner, supra note 114, at 330-31.
[Vol. 63:737
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/5
